Posts Tagged astronomy

Seven Holes in the Head

Galileo, Order, and the Persistence of Reasoning through Aesthetics

Sunflowers follow the sun across the sky, and the moon controls the tides. Move a magnet over iron filings and the iron responds. You’ve already accepted action at a distance and celestial influence. Why dismiss planetary influence on human disposition outright?

In 1610 Galileo published Sidereus Nuncius, announcing discovery of four moons of Jupiter, which he called the Medicean Stars to flatter his patron. Scholars were divided. A contemporary astronomer, Francesco Sizzi, authored a small treatise in response, Dianoia Astronomica.

No summary of Sizzi’s reasoning does it justice. You need it in his words.

Just as in the microcosm there are seven ‘windows’ in the head (two nostrils, two eyes, two ears, and a mouth), so in the macrocosm God has placed two beneficent stars, two maleficent stars, two luminaries (sun and moon), and one indifferent. The seven days of the week follow from these. Finally, since ancient times the alchemists had made each of the seven metals correspond to one of the planets; gold to the sun, silver to the moon, copper to Venus, quicksilver to Mercury, iron to Mars, tin to Jupiter, lead to Saturn.

From these and many other similar phenomena of nature such as the seven metals, we gather that the number of planets is necessarily seven… Besides, the Jews and other ancient nations as well as modern Europeans, have adopted the division of the week into seven days, and have named them from the seven planets; now if we increase the number of planets, this whole system falls to the ground… Moreover, the satellites [of Jupiter] are invisible to the naked eye and therefore can have no influence on the earth, and therefore would be useless, and therefore do not exist.

There’s reasoning for you. Seven planets. Seven holes in the head. Case closed.

Today we know how the sunflower works. We know about phototropism, auxins, differential growth rates. We understand the mechanism. Francesco Sizzi didn’t.

His world system was built on regularities, from which he inferred relationships. He saw a universe whose underlying order could be read from recurring patterns.

For Sizzi, the universe was built upon sevens: seven planets, seven metals, seven days of the week, seven openings in the head. The cosmic order was complete. Galileo’s discovery was disruptive.

For a 16th century investigator of natural phenomena, the burden of proof was on the skeptic of long-held astrological knowledge. One reason astrology hung on so long was that no one came up with a satisfactory account of causation itself. In the 18th century, philosopher David Hume demolished the notion that we directly perceive causal necessity. We still debate what causation ultimately is. Like Sizzi, we observe regularities. We infer causes.

Sizzi was not defending ignorance. He was defending a conception of reality – and giving a nod to Pragmatism, a philosophy that wouldn’t emerge for another 300 years. The cosmos, as he understood it, was a web of correspondences. Harmony was the evidence. Symmetry meant something. The recurrence of patterns across different domains was evidence of a cosmic order. Rejecting those patterns in favor of four pinpoints of light visible only through a novel instrument did not seem rational.

We hold up Galileo as an example of speaking evidence to power. But most of us don’t reason as Galileo did.

We, like Sizzi, are drawn to elegant theories. Modern folk admire symmetry. We take pleasure in explanations that unify diverse phenomena. We find beauty persuasive. Often we discover reasons for believing something only after we have fallen in love with the shape of the idea.

We can’t blame Sizzi for seeking order. But he trusted the order he had already found more than the anomaly staring back at him from the telescope. The uncomfortable possibility is that we are usually closer to Sizzi than to Galileo.

We inherit the results of the scientific revolution, but not always its habits. Given a choice between a beautiful system and an inconvenient observation, the temptation remains as it was in 1610. The telescope has merely changed shape.

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O Thick Wits, O Blind Watchers of the Sky

Everything changed right around the time of Johannes Kepler. Comets, against millennia of prior belief, were then discovered to be farther away than the moon. Aristotelian spheres had been shattered. Kepler’s Astronomia Nova announced his first two laws of planetary motion. 1: Planets moved in elliptical orbits. 2: Lines from the sun to each planet sweep out equal areas in equal times. Kepler’s deductions would have been impossible without the decades of meticulous data recorded by Tycho Brahe.

Then why was it Kepler who made these revelations, and not Tycho Brahe? The easy answer is that Johannes Kepler was a transcendent genius and Tycho Brahe was not. But that leaves out a bit that’s worth dissecting.

Brahe did something extraordinary. He made observational astronomy a precision science. Before him, astronomical measurements were uncertain by several arcminutes or worse. Tycho drove errors down toward a single arcminute. He used gigantic instruments, discipline, relentless correction and test/retest methodology. That sounds pedestrian compared to breaking Aristotle’s stronghold on thought, but it changed everything. Kepler later wrote that if Tycho’s data had been sloppier, circular orbits could have survived indefinitely.

The irony is that Tycho’s success probably trapped him intellectually. Tycho remained deeply committed to intuitive physics. Copernicanism didn’t feel right; the Earth obviously feels stationary. But his commitment was also because he took celestial physics seriously. If planets moved, what moved them? Why should Mars speed up and slow down? The Aristotelian-spheres model had indeed been cracked by the nova of 1572 and the comet of 1577. Tycho witnessed both of them. Yet, as a disciplined scholar, he wanted something mechanically intelligible in their place. His own geo-heliocentric system preserves much of the old psychological architecture: Earth central and stable, heavens ordered, motions essentially circular.

Kepler, who also initially resisted ellipses, was forced to face them. He became willing to sacrifice intuitive physics for mathematical truth. Radical. He spent years trying combinations of epicycles and ovals. The famous “eight minutes of arc” discrepancy in Mars’ orbit was decisive. Lesser minds would have dismissed it as measurement noise. For Kepler it was key. That required almost religious dedication to Tycho’s measurements.

Tycho grew up in a world where uniform circular motion was a metaphysical necessity. Circles were perfection, ellipses ugly. They seemed accidental and earthly. Kepler belonged to the transitional generation for whom reality had to fit observations.

There’s something familiar here. Scientific revolutions, as Thomas Kuhn saw them, often involve two different personalities who are incapable of understanding each other. One creates reliable phenomena, another reinterprets them. Tycho made planetary motion precise enough to become a problem. Kepler solved the problem by abandoning assumptions Tycho held sacred.

O crassa ingenia, O caecos coeli spectatores
“O thick wits, O blind watchers of the sky.”

Tycho wrote these words in the preface to De Nova Stella after the supernova of 1572. He hurled insults at scholars who refused to accept the implications of the “new star.” Aristotelian cosmology held the heavens to be changeless. Tycho measured the object carefully and showed it had no detectable parallax, meaning it was beyond the earth’s atmosphere. Aristotelian crystalline perfection was not.

Here is Tycho denouncing men who stare upward yet fail to see what is before them. Kepler later could have turned these words back on Tycho, who also stared directly at evidence having implications he refused to accept. His own measurements showed planetary motion was not circular, yet he remained committed to geometrically privileged circular motion.

Still, Tycho saw farther than his contemporaries. The subtlety here is easy to miss in “rational reconstruction” histories of science. Revolutionary evidence rarely announces its final meaning.

Tycho’s achievement was destructive before it was constructive. He demolished Aristotelianism with empirical rigor. That was enormous, and it happens often in science. The people who see anomalies often cannot reinterpret reality around them.

The tragedy and grandeur of transitional figures is that they can become prisoners of the conceptual worlds they destroy. Einstein is the obvious comparison. His work on light quanta brought the quantum revolution, yet he recoiled from indeterminacy and nonlocality: “God does not play dice.”

“Old fuddy-duddies” does not explain this. Einstein’s objections to quantum mechanics were profound and technically sophisticated. Tycho’s clutching a physically intelligible celestial order was not irrational.

Antoine Lavoisier and Lord Kelvin similarly opened doors they refused to pass through. We usually see Newton as immune to such reluctance. But consider: “That one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum… is to me so great an absurdity…” Sounds like Tycho.

Kepler and Bohr look prophetic in hindsight because history moved their way. Tycho lets us see the psychological cost of conceptual upheaval from the inside. Scientific revolutions are not merely logical sequences. They are struggles over what kinds of worlds some highly intelligent people can bear to inhabit while others cannot.

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