You’re So Wrong, Richard Feynman

“Philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds”  

This post is more thoughts on the minds of interesting folk who can think from a variety of perspectives, inspired by Bruce Vojak’s Epistemology of Innovation articles. This is loosely related to systems thinking, design thinking, or – more from my perspective – the consequence of learning a few seemingly unrelated disciplines that end up being related in some surprising and useful way.

Richard Feynman ranks high on my hero list. When I was a teenager I heard a segment of an interview with him where he talked about being a young boy with a ball in a wagon. He noticed that when he abruptly pulled the wagon forward, the ball moved to the back of the wagon, and when he stopped the wagon, the ball moved forward. He asked his dad why it did that. His dad, who was a uniform salesman, put a slightly finer point on the matter. He explained that the ball didn’t really move backward; it moved forward, just not as fast as the wagon was moving. Feynman’s dad told young Richard that no one knows why a ball behaves like that. But we call it inertia. I found both points wonderfully illuminating. On the ball’s motion, there’s more than one way of looking at things.  Mel Feynman’s explanation of the ball’s motion had gentle but beautiful precision, calling up thoughts about relativity in the simplest sense – motion relative to the wagon versus relative to the ground. And his statement, “we call it inertia,” got me thinking quite a lot about the difference between knowledge about a thing and the name of a thing. It also recalls Newton vs. the Cartesians in my recent post. The name of a thing holds no knowledge at all.

RichardFeynman-PaineMansionWoods1984_copyrightTamikoThiel_bwFeynman was almost everything a hero should be – nothing like the stereotypical nerd scientist. He cussed, pulled gags, picked locks, played drums, and hung out in bars. His thoughts on philosophy of science come to mind because of some of the philosophy-of-science issues I touched on in previous posts on Newton and Galileo. Unlike Newton, Feynman was famously hostile to philosophy of science. The ornithology quote above is attributed to him, though no one seems to have a source for it. If not his, it could be. He regularly attacked philosophy of science in equally harsh tones. “Philosophers are always on the outside making stupid remarks,“ he is quoted as saying in his biography by James Gleick.

My initial thoughts were that I can admire Feynman’s amazing work and curious mind while thinking he was terribly misinformed and hypocritical about philosophy. I’ll offer a slightly different opinion at the end of this. Feynman actually engaged in philosophy quite often. You’d think he’d at least try do a good job of it. Instead he seems pretty reckless. I’ll give some examples.

Feynman, along with the rest of science, was assaulted by the wave of postmodernism that swept university circles in the ’60s. On its front line were Vietnam protesters who thought science was a tool of evil corporations, feminists who thought science was a male power play, and Foucault-inspired “intellectuals” who denied that science had any special epistemic status. Feynman dismissed all this as a lot of baloney. Most of it was, of course. But some postmodern criticism of science was a reaction – though a gross overreaction – to a genuine issue that Kuhn elucidated – one that had been around since Socrates debated the sophists. Here’s my best Readers Digest version.

All empirical science relies on affirming the consequent, something seen as a flaw in deductive reasoning. Science is inductive, and there is no deductive justification for induction (nor is there any inductive justification for induction – a topic way too deep for a blog post). Justification actually rests on a leap of inductive faith and consensus among peers. But it certainly seems reasonable for scientists to make claims of causation using what philosophers call inference to the best explanation. It certainly seems that way to me. However, defending that reasoning – that absolute foundation for science – is a matter of philosophy, not one of science.

This issue edges us toward a much more practical one, something Feynman dealt with often. What’s the difference between science and pseudoscience (the demarcation question)? Feynman had a lot of room for Darwin but no room at all for the likes of Freud or Marx. All claimed to be scientists. All had theories. Further, all had theories that explained observations. Freud and Marx’s theories actually had more predictive success than did those of Darwin. So how can we (or Feynman) call Darwin a scientist but Freud and Marx pseudoscientists without resorting to the epistemologically unsatisfying argument made famous by Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart: “I can’t define pornography but I know it when I see it”? Neither Feynman nor anyone else can solve the demarcation issue in any convincing way, merely by using science. Science doesn’t work for that task.

It took Karl Popper, a philosopher, to come up with the counterintuitive notion that neither predictive success nor confirming observations can qualify something as science. In Popper’s view, falsifiability is the sole criterion for demarcation. For reasons that take a good philosopher to lay out, Popper can be shown to give this criterion a bit too much weight, but it has real merit. When Einstein predicted that the light from distant stars actually bends around the sun, he made a bold and solidly falsifiable claim. He staked his whole relativity claim on it. If, in an experiment during the next solar eclipse, light from stars behind the sun didn’t curve around it, he’d admit defeat. Current knowledge of physics could not support Einstein’s prediction. But they did they experiment (the Eddington expedition) and Einstein was right. In Popper’s view, this didn’t prove that Einstein’s gravitation theory was true, but it failed to prove it wrong. And because the theory was so bold and counterintuitive, it got special status. We’ll assume it true until it is proved wrong.

Marx and Freud failed this test. While they made a lot of correct predictions, they also made a lot of wrong ones. Predictions are cheap. That is, Marx and Freud could explain too many results (e.g., aggressive personality, shy personality or comedian) with the same cause (e.g., abusive mother). Worse, they  were quick to tweak their theories in the face of counterevidence, resulting in their theories being immune to possible falsification. Thus Popper demoted them to pseudoscience. Feynman cites the falsification criterion often. He never names Popper.

Feynmann_Diagram_Gluon_Radiation.svgThe demarcation question has great practical importance. Should creationism be taught in public schools? Should Karmic reading be covered by your medical insurance? Should the American Parapsychological Association be admitted to the American Association for the Advancement of Science (it was in 1969)? Should cold fusion research be funded? Feynman cared deeply about such things. Science can’t decide these issues. That takes philosophy of science, something Feynman thought was useless. He was so wrong.

Finally, perhaps most importantly, there’s the matter of what activity Feynman was actually engaged in. Is quantum electrodynamics a science or is it philosophy? Why should we believe in gluons and quarks more than angels? Many of the particles and concepts of Feynman’s science are neither observable nor falsifiable. Feynman opines that there will never be any practical use for knowledge of quarks, so he can’t appeal to utility as a basis for the scientific status of quarks. So shouldn’t quantum electrodynamics (at least with level of observability it had when Feynman gave this opinion) be classified as metaphysics, i.e., philosophy, rather than science? By Feynman’s demarcation criteria, his work should be called philosophy. I think his work actually is science, but the basis for that subtle distinction is in philosophy of science, not science itself.

While degrading philosophy, Feynman practices quite a bit of it, perhaps unconsciously, often badly. Not Dawkins-bad, but still pretty bad. His 1966 speech to the National Science Teacher’s Association entitled “What Is Science?” is a case in point. He hints at the issue of whether science is explanatory or merely descriptive, but wanders rather aimlessly. I was ready to offer that he was a great scientist and a bad accidental philosopher when I stumbled on a talk where Feynman shows a different side, his 1956 address to the Engineering and Science college at the California Institute of Technology, entitled, “The Relation of Science and Religion.”

He opens with an appeal to the multidisciplinarian:

 In this age of specialization men who thoroughly know one field are often incompetent to discuss another.  The great problems of the relations between one and another aspect of human activity have for this reason been discussed less and less in public.  When we look at the past great debates on these subjects we feel jealous of those times, for we should have liked the excitement of such argument.”

Feynman explores the topic through epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. He talks about degrees of belief and claims of certainty, and the difference between Christian ethics and Christian dogma. He handles all this delicately and compassionately, with charity and grace. He might have delivered this address with more force and efficiency, had he cited Nietzsche, Hume, and Tillich, whom he seems to unknowingly parallel at times. But this talk was a whole different Feynman. It seems that when formally called on to do philosophy, Feynman could indeed do a respectable job of it.

I think Richard Feynman, great man that he was, could have benefited from Philosophy of Science 101; and I think all scientists and engineers could. In my engineering schooling, I took five courses in calculus, one in linear algebra, one non-Euclidean geometry, and two in differential equations. Substituting a philosophy class for one of those Dif EQ courses would make better engineers. A philosophy class of the quantum electrodynamics variety might suffice.


“It is a great adventure to contemplate the universe beyond man, to think of what it means without man – as it was for the great part of its long history, and as it is in the great majority of places.  When this objective view is finally attained, and the mystery and majesty of matter are appreciated, to then turn the objective eye back on man viewed as matter, to see life as part of the universal mystery of greatest depth, is to sense an experience which is rarely described.  It usually ends in laughter, delight in the futility of trying to understand.” – Richard Feynman, The Relation of Science and Religion

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 Photo of Richard Feynman in the Payne Mansion woods copyright Tamiko Thiel, 1984. Used by permission. Feynman diagram courtesy of SilverStar.

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  1. #1 by Jerry Price on May 19, 2014 - 3:02 am

    In college Feynman use to hang out with the philosophers so I imagine he got, more or less, his fair share of “philosophy of science 101″—you might have been giving a bit less credit than is due there. I very much enjoy and dedicate a lot of my time to philosophy, and Feynman may have been an awesome guy, but he wasn’t perfect. So I hope you don’t think I’m too biased.

    There is a certain practicality that comes with conversation and because people, or scientists, talk about certain topics covered in philosophy I don’t believe that necessarily them a philosopher. Then again this is another debate up for “philosophy!” While this argument goes go people are going to ask me what I mean by, “practical conversation,” and so on goes the conversation. The point is that this article isn’t necessarily arguing that Feynman is a philosopher, it’s arguing that you believe philosophers are defined by these particular things and since Feynman participated in them, he’s a philosopher. I have a belief that serving burritos at McDonalds makes you a philosopher. Now, I then invite people to dispute this and anyone who disputes it is also a philosopher.

    It’s this kind of thing that Feynman would dismiss as nonsense and completely unpractical, and go about his business while other people like me and you dispute if these activities he’s engaging in necessarily makes him a philosopher. So, let’s begin by defining philosophy of science because this blog is aiming at needs to do that.

  2. #2 by Artem Kaznatcheev on September 29, 2014 - 2:53 pm

    An interesting question that came up in the discussion of your post on reddit, that I would like to pose (in slightly modified form) to you.

    My favourite line of your post (as you can probably guess from the reddit share on the article on TheEGG) is from the closing:

    Richard Feynman, great man that he was, could have benefited from Philosophy of Science 101; … all scientists and engineers could.”

    If you were in charge of building such a class for scientists and engineers, what would be the textbook for it? Alternatively, if no textbook exists, what would the list of topics/readings be? I think such a list — along with a few sentences of justification for each point — would be of great value to scientists wandering into the philosophy of science. I know that I would appreciate hearing your suggestion for a curriculum.

  3. #3 by Bill Storage on October 1, 2014 - 10:32 pm

    What a great question, Artem. I’ll give that more thought with intent to write a more thoughtful reply (I’m on the road for a few weeks at present).

    I had a brief look at the reddit discussion. I don’t have time at the moment to participate there but would like to note, in clarification to a point raised there, that I definitely did mean that that studying philosophy might make MUCH better engineers, not merely that it might make engineers better at philosophy.

    A very short answer would be:
    The Greeks
    Peter Abelard
    Bacon vs. Descartes on method
    Hume on induction, responses to Hume
    Hempel, Popper, Ayers
    Quine on analytic/synthetic distinction
    Science Wars
    Probability & Bayes

    Kuhn and Feyerabend would be the biggest chunk of it. Philosophy of probability, Bayesianism and criticism thereof would also get a lot of attention, especially if I were targeting engineers directly.

    I think preparing that curriculum and delivering the course would be about the best job I can imagine being charged with.


  4. #4 by Sudo Chimp on April 25, 2015 - 2:43 am

    reading your essay, and the comments of others, has compelled me to want to scream “you were so right mr feynman.” the arguments and justifications made remind me so much of those made by folks attempting to reconcile and or integrate religion with science that i wonder if philosophy is really religion adjusted to updated understanding of nature. not to say it’s unimportant: being a better person often proves – for the vast majority of us – to be far more important than being a better scientist or engineer. it’s just a waste of time trying to mix the two things together. how silly does “religion of science”, or “science of religion” sound? better to got after things like justice than waste so much effort in this rathole.

  5. #5 by Aaron Morris on July 9, 2016 - 5:17 am

    Einstein and Feynman are nothing but frauds and propagandists who promote just another form of religion.

    • #6 by Bill Storage on July 12, 2016 - 11:11 am

      I’m not seeing much connection between most religion and most science. Most science has no appeal to higher purpose. Most religious practice assumes the existence of such purpose. Einstein certainly wrote a lot of opinion that many would call poorly motivated. But that isn’t what we celebrate him for. I don’t see much connection between special/general relativity and religion or propaganda. Feynman seems more immune to the accusation of religion than anyone else I can think of. On what basis do you find his work to be religious?

  6. #7 by Zoltán Pósfai (@ZoltanAuthor) on February 7, 2017 - 10:34 am

    I think the thing that solves a lot of the contradictions/arguments/tensions between ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ is about what are scientists really creating. I’ve been telling this most of my life. (Before I continue: I’m originally a physicist, but also like philosophy.) Scientists do not describe the world. They create models, that can be described in ways fit for being ‘scientific’ (this mostly means mathematical) and thrive to create a model that a) describes what we can observe and measure as closely as possible b) can make predictions that are not just some form of replication of the things we have put in them directly.

    From your article:

    Einstein created a model that could describe things that did not fit into contemporary models. That’s the part of fitting. A prediction of that model was the effect of gravity on light. So his real statement was. “Look, if this model is close to how nature works, this effect should be observable.” There can be multiple models describing what he already know, or have observed. To chose the best ones, we expect predictions and chose the model that give the most ‘new’ things. When we get a mixture of good and bad predictions, we try to keep the ‘working’ parts and improve the ‘bad’ parts.

    Same goes for Feynman. His models included glouns that could not be observed and measured at the time. That didn’t make his model phylosophy. Just one with, at the time, unobservable predictions. We had to wait decades for LHC to start creating practical amount of quark-gluon plasma to get feedback on a lot of things.

    Back to models in general: If you look at scientific activity as building models, the distance between science and phylosophy is much less. Both try to create some construct that describes our world. The real difference is between the tools used and the need for reproducible results and predictions. Moreover, science tries to use as exact tools as possible (maths wherever possible) while philosophy uses words and languages. The latter is very flexible and undefined. Every human has a different way of using words and languages and thus you will never be able to exactly reproduce the thoughts of one person in another.

    This is not a good/bad differentiation, just a categorisation. You can be pretty sure, that when you read the ancient greek philosophers, you are thinking about different things. Yes, they will be similar. Possibly even very similar. But never the same. On the other hand, Euclidean geometry hasn’t changed a bit and when you learn about it in school, you are exactly thinking about same things.

    My personal view on Feynman’s approach on philosophy: There is a big difference between ‘philosophising freely about “things”‘ and trying to approach the world from a philosophical point of view. It’s easy to say things that sound philosophical, but have little or no value, and this lures a lot of people into it with the false sense of achievement. I think, the latter is the area he didn’t really like. It was an era when (as you cited) people redefined anything based on such axioms as ‘make love, not war’ or ‘anything up to today was male chauvinist’.

  7. #9 by Anonymous on February 20, 2018 - 9:56 am

    I think that Feynman had a philosophical (but not Philosophical) turn to his head. In other words, broader thinking about motivation and method and how to think.

    For instance, look at his story of a child buddy bragging about knowing names of some birds–the point was not to learn names but to understand what birds do. Or the story of the guy who developed all the controls for rat experiments but of how many psychologists did not do the controls but just ran rats and deducted results which could be off from not doing controls and not even being aware of the guy. Or of “try to avoid fooling yourself”.

    But not citing Kuhn and the like.

    And I really prefer that lower case stuff. Thing is is more worthwhile. Then Feynman thought so to. Think he was right to think so.

    So I get the disdain for capital P philosophy. Yep.

    • #10 by Chris Brook on March 29, 2018 - 1:44 am

      Add to this Feynman’s anecdote about the Aliens, which explains Bayesian (inductive) thinking very well… there is no falsification in his story, just likelihoods..

      IMO Feynman was spot on in his views of the philosophy of science.. as is anyone who explains a probabilistic (Bayesian) framework which is clearly the best way to provide a general way of thinking about science.. Details can be quibbled about after that

  8. #11 by Chris Brook on March 27, 2018 - 8:17 am

    I guess I am missing something as I dont see the fuss about the demarcation problem. As Laundan argued, why does scientific knowledge need to be epistemically distinct from other knowledge? And in particular if one works within an inductive framework, isn’t it enough that some theories, whether designated as being scientific or not, are designated as having low probability. Sometimes vanishingly low.

    I do understand that there are funding issues etc for calling thing science, but isnt that an issue for policy makers? Why is it an issue for philosophers? And on that, what is wrong with a philosphy of science/knowledge that does not recognise demarcation as being fundamental but considers it a matter of definitition for anyone to make, and what is wrong with someone then chosing falsification not as a philosophy but as a manner of defining the demarcation?

  9. #12 by Jarrod on August 13, 2018 - 5:59 pm

    If all scientists were like Feynman he might be on on something.

  10. #13 by Israel Socratus Sadovnik on January 24, 2021 - 6:36 am

    About philosophy of science.
    Book “Facing Up”
    “I think few philosophers of science take it (discussing questions about scientific knowledge) as part of their job description to help
    scientists in their research. . . . . why this should be? Why should the philosophy of science not be of more help to scientists? I raise
    this question here not in order to attack the philosophy of science, but because I think it is an interesting question – perhaps even
    philosophically interesting,”
    / page 84 /
    “ . . . it’s not the job of physicists or other scientists to define truth; that is the job of philosophers. If they haven’t done that job, too bad
    for them”
    / page 104 /
    “My point is rather that no sense can be made of the notion of reality as it has ordinarily functioned in the philosophy of science”
    /page 205/
    “Fortunately we need not allow philosophers to dictate how philosophical arguments are to be applied in the history
    of science, or in scientific research itself, . . . .”
    /page 205/
    / by Steven Weinberg. The Nobel Prize in Physics 1979 /

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  2. Radicalization, expertise, and skepticism among doctors & engineers: the value of philosophy in education | Theory, Evolution, and Games Group
  3. Radicalization, expertise, and skepticism among doctors & engineers: the value of philosophy in education | TRIFORCE STUDIO
  4. You’re So Wrong, Richard Feynman — The Multidisciplinarian – Round Table. Provocations & Reflections

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